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623 
FIXING COPYRIGHT’S THREE-YEAR 
LIMITATIONS CLOCK: THE ACCRUAL OF AN 
INFRINGEMENT CLAIM UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 507(B) 
I. INTRODUCTION: WINNING THE BATTLE, BUT LOSING THE WAR 
Ten years ago, James Tomasini, an accomplished but hypothetical 
Midwestern artist and botanist, published a collection of his artistic works. 
The collection included dozens of reproductions of Tomasini’s paintings of 
wildflowers, each painstakingly researched, beautifully rendered, and taking 
hundreds of hours to complete.1 Tomasini registered his copyrights for each 
individual work and for the entire collection,2 and copyright notices were 
prominently affixed beneath each illustration and to the title page of the 
collection.3 
Eight years ago, Pacific Mills, a large but fictitious California linen 
manufacturer, purchased a copy of Tomasini’s published and copyrighted 
collection, digitally scanned several of Tomasini’s wildflower illustrations, 
and began producing a new line of linens bearing his work.4 Pacific Mills 
paid no licensing fees or royalties to Tomasini, and chose not to obtain the 
artist’s permission to copy his illustrations. The company sold the linens 
throughout California and the Pacific Northwest and, for several years, 
quietly profited from Tomasini’s work. Although sales slumped after the first 
few years and Pacific Mills ultimately phased out the line, the linens were, 
overall, a huge success for the company. Purchasers of the linens would later 
note they were drawn to Tomasini’s beautiful, unique, and intricate floral 
 
 
 1. Tomasini’s illustrations were copyrightable subject matter under Section 102(a) of the 1976 
federal Copyright Act, which provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” Works of authorship include “pictorial 
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1998). 
 2. Copyright owners do not forfeit protection by failing to register their work. However, the 
author of an original work is wise to register the work promptly with the Copyright Office to ensure 
their ability to file suit and recover certain monetary remedies in the event of copyright infringement. 
First, successful registration constitutes “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright.” 17 
U.S.C. § 410(c) (1998). Also, a copyright owner must register his or her copyright before an 
infringement action may be brought. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1998). Finally, untimely registration may 
limit or prevent awards of statutory damages and attorney’s fees to prevailing copyright owners in 
infringement actions. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1998). 
 3. Valid notice of copyright (e.g. “Ó John Doe 2000”) affixed to a work by the copyright owner 
provides notice to the public that the work is protected and will generally defeat a defendant’s claim of 
innocent or “non-willful” infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (1998). 
 4. Acme’s linens, on which Tomasini’s wildflower illustrations were printed, were infringing 
reproductions or derivative works under § 106 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1998) 
(entitled “Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works”). 
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designs. 
Tomasini was an artist and scientist, not a savvy marketer. He sold 
original paintings, reproductions, and collections of his work, but had little 
interest in exploiting other commercial markets. He did not compete with 
Pacific Mills in any way, choosing instead to concentrate on his botany and 
art. As a result, Tomasini was wholly unaware of Pacific Mills and their sale 
of the infringing linens until his wife, while travelling in California, 
discovered a set of Pacific Mills bed sheets bearing her husband’s work in a 
San Francisco bed-and-breakfast.5 
Tomasini immediately retained counsel and filed a civil copyright 
infringement suit against Pacific Mills requesting an injunction and 
restitution in the amount of the company’s ill-gotten profits.6 The entire line 
of linens constituted a “smoking gun,” as Pacific Mills could not, and did not, 
dispute that they had infringed Tomasini’s intellectual property rights.7 The 
court promptly awarded summary judgement against Pacific Mills and 
ordered that the company be enjoined from further copying and use of the 
artist’s works.8 Tomasini won the battle, but it would prove to be a hollow 
and financially unsatisfactory victory. 
Unfortunately for the artist, Tomasini’s court adopted the prevailing 
interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), the federal Copyright Act’s statute of 
limitations (“507(b),” “Section 507(b),” or “the Statute”). The Statute 
 
 
 5. This scenario is loosely based on the facts of a civil copyright infringement action brought in 
1997 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas.  
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) provides that in cases of willful, “non-innocent” infringement, a 
prevailing copyright owner may recover actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the 
infringement [e.g. their own lost revenues], and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the 
infringement.” 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1998). Section 504(b) prevents “double recovery” of both damages 
and the infringer’s profits by adding that only those profits “not taken into account in computing the 
actual damages” may be recovered. Id. 
 A prevailing copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgement is rendered, to recover 
an award of statutory damages in lieu of actual damages or a defendant’s profits. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) 
(1998). Injunctive relief and attorney’s fees are also routinely awarded to prevailing copyright owners. 
17 U.S.C. § 502 (1998); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1998). This Note focuses, in part, on Section 507(b)’s effect 
on remedial awards of damages and profits—other remedies (e.g. statutory damages and injunctive 
relief) are generally beyond its scope.  
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 501 provides that “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author . . . ” The exclusive rights of 
the copyright owner include the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative works 
based on the copyrighted work, and distribute copies of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1998). 
In the hypothetical case, each time Pacific Mills digitally scanned Tomasini’s copyrighted works or 
printed the works on their linens during the manufacturing process it infringed the artist’s work by 
“reproducing” the work and/or “preparing derivative works.” In addition, each time the company sold 
the infringing linens to retailers or consumers it committed the infringing act of “distribution.” Id.  
 8. Injunctions are granted as a matter of course in cases of copyright infringement, pursuant to 
17 U.S.C. § 502 (1998). 
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provides that “no civil [copyright] action shall be maintained…unless it is 
commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”9 The court held that 
Tomasini’s claim accrued when Pacific Mills’ infringements occurred and, 
accordingly, started the three-year limitations clock at that time. 
Guided by this prevailing interpretation of the Statute,10 the court refused 
to award profits to Tomasini for infringements that occurred more than three 
years prior to the filing of his suit. The court found that Pacific Mills had 
realized nearly one million dollars in net profits as a direct result of their 
infringement.11 However, as all these profits resulted from infringing acts 
that occurred or were committed more than three years prior to suit, 
Tomasini received nothing. Pacific Mills retained the full amount—nearly 
one million dollars—“earned” by the company through their flagrant copying 
of Tomasini’s paintings and their willful and continuing infringement of the 
artist’s intellectual property rights. 
As Tomasini learned the hard way, the prevailing interpretation and 
application of 507(b) leaves many copyright owners a right without a 
monetary remedy. The current state of the Statute is incorrect and inequitable 
not because it bars copyright infringement suits and other actions (it does 
not), but because it drastically limits, and often eliminates entirely, monetary 
awards to deserving and reasonably diligent copyright owners such as 
Tomasini, while leaving infringers such as Pacific Mills wealthier and 
 
 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1998). The Statute is entitled “Limitations on Actions.” 
 10. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05[A] at 12-115-16 (1997) (stating that “the prevailing 
view is . . . that the statute of limitations bars recovery on any damage claim that accrued over three 
years prior to filing of suit” and that “the time ‘the claim accrued’ . . . is the time that the infringement 
upon which suit is based occurred”); Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 
199, 202 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder the prevailing view, a party cannot reach back, based on acts of 
infringement that accrued within the limitations period, and recover for claims that accrued outside the 
limitations period.”); Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 57 n.8 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Recovery is barred for any 
infringing acts occurring more than three years prior to suit.”); Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 
F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994) (no “reach back” for infringements occurring outside the statutory 
period); Makedwde Pub. Co. v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994) (defendant liable only for 
acts of infringement committed within three years prior to plaintiff’s lawsuit”); Kregos v. Associated 
Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993); Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“[r]ecovery is allowed only for those acts occurring within three years of suit, and is disallowed for 
earlier infringing acts.”). 
 Some courts have chosen not to enter the fray. See, e.g., MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 962 
F.2d 978, 987 n.9 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting, but not resolving, the “division in the interpretations of the 
statute,” but adding that “the substantial risk of claims of [the plain tiff] being barred may not be 
disregarded”). 
 11. Only those damages and profits that are a result of or directly attributable to the infringement 
may be awarded. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1998). Courts must routinely engage in the difficult and 
somewhat inexact process of apportioning damages and profits between those attributable to the 
infringement (e.g. sales and revenue resulting from Tomasini’s floral designs) and those attributable to 
other sources (e.g. sales and revenue resulting from Pacific Mills’ high quality material or low prices). 
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undeterred. As the above hypothetical suggests, resolving the Statute’s 
ambiguities is not an empty exercise in statutory interpretation and legal 
lexicon. To the contrary, millions of dollars in damages and ill-gotten profits 
are at stake, and plaintiffs seeking monetary recovery for copyright 
infringement are directly and adversely effected by the current state of the 
Statute. 
Section II of this Note examines the purposes of copyright protection and 
monetary awards in cases of copyright infringement. Section II also reviews 
the legislative and judicial history of the Statute, and the purposes of statutes 
of limitations in general, in order to shed light on how 507(b) reached its 
current, unfortunate state. Section III of this Note analyzes the plain language 
of the Statute, the proper definition of “accrual” in the context of a copyright 
infringement claim, the prevailing “backwards” interpretation and 
application of 507(b), and the proposed forward-looking application of the 
Statute. Section III also examines how this proposed version is consistent 
with the Constitutional purposes of copyright protection, the goals of 
monetary remedies, and the rationale behind statutes of limitation in general. 
Sections IV and V of the Note conclude that the Copyright Act and 
Section 507(b) should be amended by Congress or definitively interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to allow a reasonably diligent copyright owner to reach 
back and recover damages or profits for all copyright infringements, 
including those committed more than three years prior to filing of the 
infringement suit. Specific language for the proposed amendment is provided 
in Section IV. 
II. THE STATUTE 
Section 507(b) provides that “no civil [copyright] action shall be 
maintained…unless it is commenced within three years after the claim 
accrued.”12 Contrary to the contention of one court that the Statute is “clear 
on its face,”13 the language of 507(b), and the word “accrued” in particular, 
has been a source of continuing disagreement and misinterpretation by the 
courts.14 A review of the purposes of copyright protection, monetary awards, 
 
 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1998) (emphasis added). 
 13. Roley, 19 F.3d at 481.  
 14. Because Congress is apparently enamored with the language of “accrual,” courts must 
continue to wrestle with other federal statutes of limitations on whose interpretation the correct 
definition of “accrual” depends. For example, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify 28 
U.S.C.§ 2401(b), the limitations provision applicable to tort claims against the United States. United 
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). The provision provides that “[a] tort claim against the United 
States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/11
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and statutes of limitations in general, and the legislative and judicial history 
of 507(b) shed light on how the Statute reached its current state. 
A. The Purposes of Copyright Protection and Monetary Awards 
Copyright protection, and intellectual property protection in general, is 
aimed at striking a balance between societal benefits and the encouragement 
and reward of individual creativity. While the framers of the Constitution 
explicitly provided copyright protection in the United States “to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,”15 intellectual property law in the United 
States is also fundamentally about incentives to invent and create.16 While 
copyright law makes reward to the copyright owner a secondary 
consideration to societal benefits,17 the Supreme Court has noted that 
copyright protection nonetheless is intended to “motivate the creative activity 
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward”18 and to “grant 
valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc.”19 Most, if not all, 
copyright owners hope and expect to reap the financial rewards of their 
creativity. Accordingly, the Copyright Act provides that the owner of a 
protected and infringed work may recover his or her actual damages or the 
infringer’s illegal profits.20 
A monetary award to a copyright owner whose work has been infringed 
 
 
two years after such claim accrues . . . ” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1998). The Court held that a claim 
“accrues” within the meaning of the statute when the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause 
of his injury, rather than at the time he learns that acts inflicting the injury might constitute a tort. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122. 
 Similarly, the failure of Congress and the Supreme Court to define “accrual” in the context of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (the civil and criminal provisions of the 1994 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (“RICO”) Act) has resulted in the federal courts’ development of four distinct rules for 
determining when a civil RICO action accrues and when the statute limitations begins to run. For an 
excellent discussion of the “accrual” of a civil cause of action under RICO, see Dana P. Babb, Recent 
Development, Asked But Not Answered—Accrual of Private Civil RICO Claims Following Klehr v. 
A.O. Smith Corp., 76 WASH . U. L.Q. 1149 (1998).  
 15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. See ROBERT P. MERGES, et al., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  IN T HE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 12 (1997).  
 17. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Stating that “private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, 
and the other arts” and that “the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good”). 
 18. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 19. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The Mazer Court added that “[s]acrificial days 
devoted to . . . creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.” Id. 
It is important to note that while rewarding copyright owners may be a “secondary consideration,” 
statements supporting the protection of willful copyright infringers are entirely absent from the 
Constitution, Copyright Act, and legislative history.  
 20. See supra  note 6. 
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serves several specific purposes. In enacting the Copyright Act, Congress 
noted that actual damages are awarded to compensate a copyright owner for 
financial losses resulting from infringement (e.g. lost sales or market share), 
while an infringer’s profits are awarded to prevent an infringer from unfairly 
benefiting from a wrongful act and to deter would-be infringers.21 In the 
Section I hypothetical scenario, the copyright owner incurred no actual 
damages; Tomasini was not in the linen business and lost no sales or market 
share to Pacific Mills as a result of the infringing activities. Instead, Tomasini 
sought monetary relief in the amount of Pacific Mills’ profits. As Tomasini 
learned, however, the Statute directly impacts monetary awards by dictating 
and limiting the period for which a copyright owner may reach back and 
recover actual damages or an infringer’s profits. 
B. The Purposes of Statutes of Limitations, and the Birth of 507(b) 
Section 507(b), and statutes of limitations in general, have historically 
been justified in several ways. One justification is repose for defendants and 
society; the concept that infringers should, at some point in time, be able to 
rely on a copyright owner’s silence and failure to file suit and that courts 
should not be overburdened with “stale claims.”22 Another common 
justification for statutes of limitation is “evidentiary” in nature, based on the 
concept that parties should not lose the ability to present a case in court due 
to “the loss of evidence [and] fading memories” and the disappearance of 
witnesses and documents.23 
The original federal Copyright Act contained a three-year statute of 
limitations for criminal copyright infringement proceedings24 but contained 
 
 
 21. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976). See also  Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright 
Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use: Restitutionary Recovery in Copyright Infringement 
Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 93.  
 22. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). The Kubrick court stated that “statutes of 
limitations . . . represent a pervasive legislative judgement that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary 
on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in 
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’” Id. See also  David E. Harrell, Difficulty 
Counting Backwards from Three: Conflicting Interpretations of the Statute of Limitations on Civil 
Copyright Infringement, 48 SMU L.Rev. 669, 673-74 (1995). Harrell emphasizes the purpose of 
statutes of limitations in concluding, contrary to the conclusion of this Note, that the prevailing 
interpretation of the Statute is “consistent with the goals of statutes of limitations: to protect against the 
loss of evidence and provide repose for defendants and society.” Id. at 685. 
 23. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117; see also  Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Harrell, 48 SMU L.Rev. at 674. 
 24. The criminal copyright infringement statute of limitations survives today as § 507(a) of the 
Copyright Act, which provides that “no criminal proceeding shall be  maintained . . . unless it is 
commenced within five years after the cause of action arose.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1998). Section 
507(a) originally provided for a three year limitations period, but was recently amended to extend the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/11
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no such statute for civil copyright infringement actions until 1957. Prior to 
that time, federal courts in civil copyright infringement actions applied the 
applicable tort statute of limitations of the state in which the action was 
brought.25 In 1957, Congress enacted a statute of limitations for civil 
copyright infringement actions,26 citing concerns over the “wide divergence 
of time periods” provided in the statutes of limitation of various states and 
the potential for “forum shopping” by copyright owners.27  
In enacting the Statute, Congress emphasized that Section 507(b) was to 
“extend to the remedy of the person affected thereby, and not to his 
substantive rights.”28 Adding that “statutes of limitations take the form of 
[either] a limitation upon the substantive right or upon the remedy,” Congress 
noted that “under [this] remedial type of statute, the basic right is not 
 
 
period to five years. This Note confines its scope to civil copyright infringement actions.  
 Section 507(b) was enacted, in part, in response to the existing criminal statute of limitations. 
Congress sought to determine “the most equitable period [for a civil statute of limitations] . . . in view 
of the existing three-year period with regard to criminal actions.” S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957). 
Interestingly, while Congress was apparently seeking consistency among the two statutes, they failed 
to adopt consistent language. Section 507(a), the criminal statute, starts the five-year “clock” when a 
“cause of action arises,” while Section 507(b), the civil statute, starts its three-year clock when a 
“claim accrues.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(a), (b) (1998). As one commentator noted about this discrepancy, 
“[t]he use of ‘claim’ rather than ‘cause of action’ for civil purposes is in harmony with Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure practice. Query, however, whether there is any substantive significance between 
‘arose’ and ‘accrued?’” 3 NIMMER at 12-115. 
 25. See 3 NIMMER at 12-115. 
 26. Originally codified in 1957 as 17 U.S.C. § 115(b), the statute of limitations was re-codified in 
1976 as 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
 Congress intended Section 507(b) to “provide a uniform [statute of limitations] period throughout 
the United States.” S. Rep. No. 85-1014, at 4 (1957). The Statute did, of course, provide a uniform 
three-year time period throughout the United States. However, the Statute has not been interpreted or 
applied uniformly and, as such, its success in eliminating “forum shopping” appear doubtful. See, e.g., 
David E. Harrell, Comment, Difficulty Counting Backwards From Three: Conflicting Interpretations 
of the Statute of Limitations on Civil Copyright Infringement, 48 SMU L. REV. 669, 685 (1995) 
(concluding that “the goals of uniformity have not been met).  
 27. S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957). The Senate Report noted that “in Alabama the statute of 
limitations applied to this type of action is [one] year,” in New York the period was “apparently [six] 
years,” and in Wyoming “the period was [eight] years.” Id. The Report, citing California’s two-year 
statute of limitations due to the “centralization of the movie industry,” added that “[s]tates where the 
incident of copyright actions is low have applied longer periods for the commencement of actions.” Id. 
Finally, the Report noted that the legal adviser of the Copyright Office, representatives of the 
American Bar Association, and “interested industrial associations” agreed to a three-year uniform 
statute of limitations, “feeling that this represents the best balance attainable to this type of action.” Id. 
 28. Id. at 3. (emphasis added). See also  Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“Merely because [the plaintiff] could have brought suit in 1979 does not prevent her suit (only some 
of the relief sought) in 1985. To hold otherwise would ignore the long established rule that statutes of 
limitations bar remedies, not the assertion of rights”). The Stone court seemed unaware that many 
statutes of limitations bar substantive rights and not remedies. For example, the patent statute of 
limitations (35 U.S.C. § 286) is “a limitation upon the substantive right rather than upon the remedy.” 
S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 3 (1957). (emphasis added). 
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extinguished, but the limitation is applied merely to the remedy.”29 Courts 
would later invoke this legislative language in defending their interpretation 
that 507(b) bars any and all monetary remedies for infringements occurring 
more than three years prior to the filing of the infringement suit.30 
C. Judicial Interpretation of 507(b): The Courts Enter the Fray 
As one court noted, it is odd that, considering how often the situation 
presented in Section I must arise, there is so little case history discussing the 
Statute’s application in such instances.31 Given the prevailing interpretation 
of Section 507(b) and supporting court decisions, however, it is clear that a 
case involving facts similar to those of Section I would almost invariably 
result in the same holding and the denial of an adequate and equitable 
monetary remedy to a deserving and reasonably diligent copyright owner.32 
 
 
 29. S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 3 (1957) (emphasis added). In the hypothetical example of Section I, 
Tomasini retained the substantive right to file an infringement suit, but her monetary remedy was 
barred. 
 The Senate Report stated that “[I]t is believed that the nature of copyright infringement, together 
with the relatively short period of limitation proposed in this bill, warrants the conclusion that a 
limitation on the remedy is appropriate.” Id. at 5. Congress failed to elaborate on what it considered 
the “nature of copyright infringement.”  
 Congress had one eye fixed on the statute of limitations contained in the federal Patent Act as they 
drafted § 507(b). The patent statute of limitations, codified as 35 U.S.C. § 286, provides that “no 
recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the 
complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.” In enacting 507(b), Congress noted that 
they were aware that “the [six -year] statute of limitations in the patent code . . . is a limitation upon the 
substantive right rather than upon the remedy” and added that “the relatively longer period of 
limitation provided [in the patent statute of limitations] compensates for the difference in concept.” S. 
Rep. No . 85-1014, at 3 (19570. Congress apparently reasoned that statutes of limitations barring 
substantive rights (e.g. the Patent Act’s statute of limitations) were significantly more harsh than those 
merely barring remedies (e.g. 507(b)) and that, therefore, providing a longer period for the former 
struck an equitable balance.  
 Section 507(b)’s language of “accrual” is not the only source of confusion in the respective 
statutes of limitation contained in the Patent and Copyright Acts. Congress continued to struggle with 
their nomenclature in writing and titling the copyright and patent statutes of limitation. Strangely, the 
Patent Act’s statute of limitation, ostensibly a limit upon the substantive right, is entitled “Time 
Limitation on Damages,” while 507(b), designed to impose a limit on the remedy, is entitled 
“Limitations on Actions.”   
 30. See infra  note 53 and accompanying text. 
 31. 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983). The Taylor court noted the “tendency in modern law is 
to toll the statute of limitations until the victim could reasonably have discovered the cause of his 
woe,” but admitted that they could not “find a copyright case on point.” Id. at 1117-18. The court 
observed that “[o]ddly, considering how often the issue must arise, we have found little mention of 
such a rule in the cases.” Id. at 1118. One possible explanation for the paucity of cases on point is that 
the Statute’s prevailing application effectively deters copyright owners from seeking monetary relief 
for infringements occurring more than three years prior to the t ime they were able to detect the 
infringements and file suit.  
 32. Only in the Seventh Circuit, in light of the Taylor holding based on the questionable 
“continuing wrong” theory, might a plaintiff copyright owner “reach back” and recover for infringing 
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While courts have been all over the map regarding the Statute’s 
interpretation and application since its enactment, one groundbreaking 
case—and its subsequent and nearly universal rejection—is critical in 
understanding Section 507(b). 
1. Taylor v. Meirick: Getting it Right, for the Wrong Reasons 
In 1983, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a plaintiff 
copyright owner “can complain about infringing sales that occurred more 
than three years before he sues.”33 The court, in Taylor v. Meirick ,34 
addressed facts similar to those of the Section I hypothetical and answered in 
the affirmative. 
In Taylor, the defendant reproduced and sold copyrighted fishing maps 
without the plaintiff’s authorization.35 The plaintiff learned of the 
infringements in 1979 and promptly filed suit on May 8, 1980.36 The 
defendant argued that the Statute barred the plaintiff’s suit and any monetary 
remedy because the defendant had stopped selling the maps to retailers 
before May 8, 1977,37 three years before the suit was filed. The court 
disagreed, characterizing the defendant’s infringement as a “continuing 
wrong”38 and noting that “the initial copying was not a separate and 
completed wrong but simply the first step in a course of wrongful conduct 
that continued till the last copy of the infringing map was sold” by the 
defendant.39 Because the plaintiff did not discover the infringing maps until 
1979, and because the defendant’s “final act of an unlawful course of 
conduct” occurred within three years of filing,40 the Taylor court allowed the 
 
 
acts committed more than three years prior to filing of the suit.  
 33. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1117-18. 
 36. Id. The Taylor court noted that the plaintiff was allowed to “collect damages for acts of 
infringement more than three years in the past” largely because he “sued promptly when he discovered 
that the infringing maps were . . . being sold.” Id. at 1119. The court added that the plaintiff “was 
unaware of the infringements until 1979, and (in part because of [the defendant’s] efforts at 
concealment) could not have been expected to discover them earlier by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance.” Id. 
 37. The court assumed that “[the defendant] really did stop selling the maps before May 8, 
1977,” but ultimately reasoned that the date the defendant stopped infringing was irrelevant because of 
the “uncontested fact that [the plaintiff] did not learn  of the infringements until 1979,” well within 
three years of filing suit. 712 F.2d at 1117 (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. at 1119. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. The defendant’s retailers continued to sell infringing maps manufactured by the defendant 
until 1979, and the defendant “made insufficient efforts to prevent [the retailers] from doing so.” Id. at 
1117. 
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plaintiff to “reach back and get damages for the entire duration of the alleged 
violation.”41 The plaintiff copyright owner was awarded damages for all of 
the infringements, including those occurring more than three years prior to 
the filing of the suit.42 The Taylor court relied almost entirely on the 
“continuing wrong” theory in justifying a damage award for infringements 
committed outside the three year period. This reliance would later prove fatal 
to the case’s acceptance by other courts.43 
2. Rejecting Taylor and the “Continuing Wrong” Theory: Throwing 
the Baby Out with the Bath Water 
Nearly all courts, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits, have rejected the Seventh Circuit’s “continuing wrong”-based 
holding in Taylor.44 These courts strictly limit monetary recovery to 
infringements occurring or committed within three years prior to filing.45 The 
 
 
 41. 712 F.2d at  1119. 
 42. Id. at 1122. The court affirmed a finding that Taylor, the plaintiff, had lost $19,300 in sales as 
a result of the defendant’s infringement. Id. 
 43. In addition to invoking the “continuing wrong” theory, the Taylor court emphasized that the 
defendant had “fraudulently concealed” his infringement by affixing his own fraudulent copyright 
notice on his copies of the plaintiff’s maps. 712 F.2d at 1118. Section 507(b) does not include specific 
language regarding the tolling of the Statute due to equitable considerations such as the infringer’s 
fraudulent concealment. However, the Senate Report noted that including this language was 
“unnecessary, inasmuch as the ‘federal district courts generally recognize these equitable defenses 
anyway.’” S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 3 (1957). The Report stated that “[e]quitable considerations are 
available to prolong the time for bringing suit in such cases where there exist the disabilities of 
insanity [or] infancy, absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction, fraudulent concealment, etc.” Id. 
It is also conceivable that duress or coercion against filing suit could toll the statute of limitations. See 
NIMMER § 12.05[B] at 12-124.9. 
 The law is clear that fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action tolls the running 
of the statute of limitations. See Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992). The Stone 
court concluded, however, that “[f]raudulent concealment does not lessen a plaintiff’s duty of 
diligence; it merely measures what a reasonably diligent plaintiff would or could have known 
regarding the claim.” Id. at 1048-49. In addition, the defendant’s concealment of an infringing work 
will not cause a tolling of the statute if the plaintiff is aware of facts that should put him on inquiry as 
to a potential infringement claim. See, e.g., NIMMER § 12.05[B] at 12-124.9; Prather v. Neva 
Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 44. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 202(4th Cir. 1997); Roley 
v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 
1049-50(2d Cir. 1992); Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11, 11 (6th Cir. 1981); In re 
Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 964 F.Supp. 1469, 1478 (D.Kan. 1997) 
(“[c]ourts generally have not extended the continuing wrong theory beyond the facts of Taylor and, in 
many cases, rejected the theory as a matter of law in the copyright infringement context”). 
 45. See, e.g., Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the Statute in 
the context of copyright renewal and holding that “[r]ecovery is allowed only for those acts occurring 
within three years of suit, and is disallowed for earlier infringing acts.”) (emphasis added). Ironically, 
the Stone court adopted a definition of “accrual” that is entirely inconsistent with this rigid application. 
See infra  note 57 and accompanying text. 
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Fifth Circuit noted that “[t]he Taylor court seems to have expanded the 
definition of [copyright] infringement to include a defendant’s actions 
outside the limitations period which continue to cause harm to the plaintiff 
within the period.”46 The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the “continuing 
wrong” doctrine in cases of copyright infringement by stating flatly that the 
Statute “does [not] provide for any reach back if an act of infringement 
occurs within the statutory period.”47 One court correctly noted that “the 
continuing violation doctrine has been applied very infrequently outside the 
Title VII employment discrimination context” and that “[t]he limited areas in 
which courts have broadened the doctrine’s application have involved 
explicit statutory language, unequivocal legislative intent, or contractual 
agreements.”48 
Unfortunately, based on the Seventh Circuit’s unnecessary adoption of 
the “continuing wrong” theory, other courts have been able to readily and 
conveniently dismiss the Taylor decision. As the following Section 
illustrates, the Taylor court need not have relied on this discredited theory to 
arrive at the same, equitable result. The proper definition of “accrual” and the 
correct “forward” application of the Statute would have sufficed. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Prevailing “Backwards” Application of the Statute 
It is understandable how courts have come to misinterpret the Statute and 
arrive at the current interpretation. The Statute seems, at first glance, to 
provide a clear “starting point” from which the courts can calculate monetary 
awards—the easily ascertainable filing date of a civil action. Similarly, the 
dates the infringing acts were committed provide a convenient “ending 
point.” 
Courts eager to define the period for which monetary remedies may be 
awarded may simply “count backwards”49 three years from the filing date 
 
 
 46. Makedwde Publishing Company v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994). The 
Makedwde court tersely concluded that it was “persuaded by the Ninth, Sixth and Second Circuits’ 
interpretation of section 507(b).” Id.  
 47. Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hoey v. Dexel 
Systems Corp., 716 F.Supp. 222, 223 (E.D.Va. 1989)). 
 48. United Cities Gas Co. v. Brock Exploration Co., 984 F.Supp. 1379, 1388 (D.Kan. 1997). 
Unfortunately, Section 507(b)’s statutory language and legislative history are entirely silent on the 
“continuing wrong” doctrine. See S. REP. NO. 85-1014 (1957). 
 49. The concept of “counting backwards” is gleaned from David E. Harrell’s analysis of 507(b) 
in Difficulty Counting Backwards From Three: Conflicting Interpretations of the Statute of Limitations 
on Civil Copyright Infringement. 48 SMU L. REV. 669 (1995). Harrell concludes, in direct contrast to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p623 Starr.doc  4/20/01   5:37 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
634 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:623 
 
 
 
 
and award damages or profits only for infringing acts committed within that 
period. For example, in Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd.,50 a case involving 
the alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s screenplay by the defendant film 
producer, the Ninth Circuit first noted that the plaintiff copyright owner filed 
his suit on February 7, 1991. Counting back three years, the court stated that 
the Statute therefore barred “recovery of any damages [for claims] that 
accrued prior to February 7, 1988.”51 Finding that the plaintiff failed to 
produce any evidence that the defendant engaged in “actionable conduct” 
within the three-year period, the Roley court affirmed the district court’s 
holding that the Statute barred any and all monetary relief.52  
By viewing the Statute in this backwards manner, courts are able to turn 
507(b) on its head, ignore the sticky issues of accrual, and justify their 
holdings by reminding the empty-handed plaintiff that the Statute was 
intended to “extend to the remedy.”53 Avoiding untidy questions about when 
a claim “accrues” in favor of easy determinations about the date the suit was 
filed and the dates infringing acts occurred is an understandable judicial 
reaction, but it results in an application of 507(b) that cannot be justified by 
either the Statute’s plain language or its legislative history.54 
 
 
the conclusion reached by this Note, that a strict rule “[l]imiting damages to recovery only for 
infringements occurring within the [three-year] statutory period is consistent with the language of the 
statute, as well as the stated drafters’ intent.” Id. at 677 (emphasis added).  
 50. 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 51. Id. at 481. 
 52. Id. at 482. See also Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 507 F.Supp. 1128 
(D. Nev. 1980). In Wood, the court first noted that the “[p]laintiff filed this action on January 2, 1979.” 
Id. at 1134. The court then adopted the prevailing application of the Statute, counted back three years 
from the filing date, and concluded that the “plaintiff may sue only for those alleged infringements 
occurring on or after January 2, 1976.” Id. at 1135.  
 In the Section I scenario, the court applied this “backwards” interpretation of the Statute by (1) 
determining the filing date, (2) counting back three years, and (3) awarding Tomasini nothing because 
no infringements were committed within that three-year period.  
 53. S. Rep. No. 85-1014, at 3 (1957). See Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(limiting plaintiff to recovery for infringing acts occurring within three years of suit, and explaining 
that “to hold otherwise would ignore the long established rule that statutes of limitations bar remedies 
. . . ”; see also  Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996). The Merchant court correctly held that 
“[a] cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the 
claim is premised.” Id. at 56 (citing Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992)). However, 
the Merchant court then inexplicably reverted to the strict and incorrect interpretation of the Statute by 
concluding, in a terse footnote, that their holding “[did] not disturb [its] previous rulings that a 
copyright owner’s . . . recovery is barred for any infringing acts occurring more than three years prior 
to suit.” 92 F.3d at 57 n.8 (emphasis added). 
 When viewed in light of the Statute’s plain language, Congress’s admonishment that the Statute 
extends to the remedy ultimately means only that damage and profit awards (the remedy) are limited to 
infringement claims accruing within three years of filing. The proposed interpretation and application 
of the Statute is consistent with this Congressional caveat. 
 54. Many courts devote considerable time and effort to deciding whether, for purposes of the 
Statute, each act of infringement in a continuing series is a distinct harm giving rise to an independent 
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B. When Does A Copyright Infringement Claim Accrue? 
Determining the moment when a copyright infringement claim accrues is 
not an empty exercise. It is critical because, by the plain language of the 
Statute, the three-year limitations “clock” begins to run at that moment.55 
Courts that interpret and apply the Statute’s “accrual” language generally 
follow one of two approaches. Some courts hold that a copyright 
infringement claim accrues when the infringement(s) on which the claim(s) 
is based occurs.56 Others subscribe to the “discovery rule,” which provides 
that a copyright infringement claim accrues when the copyright owner knows 
of the infringement on which the claim is based or is “chargeable” with such 
knowledge.57 Given the Statute’s plain language and legislative history, only 
 
 
claim of relief, or whether each act is merely a part of a single, unified claim (i.e. Taylor’s “continuing 
wrong”). See, e.g., Makedwde Publishing Company v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that “each act of infringement . . . [gives rise] to a separate claim” and that “the conflict 
between the Seventh Circuit decision in Taylor and the Second Circuit decision in Stone turns on each 
court’s definition of infringement”). Id. at  182.  
 However, like the issues of “fraudulent concealment” and “continuing wrongs,” discussing the 
nature and definition of copyright infringement is a red herring for purposes of correctly interpreting 
and applying the Statute. This is particularly evident in light of the fact that a plaintiff copyright owner 
may file a single suit for a single infringing act or for an entire ongoing series of infringements. It 
simply does not matter whether one or more infringements are considered separate and distinct torts or 
a single “continuing wrong.” The hypothetical situation of Section I provides an example. If the entire 
series of infringing acts committed by Pacific Mills was treated as a single, continuing wrong, then 
that continuing wrong would have accrued at the moment Tomasini’s husband informed her that he 
had seen a Pacific Mills sheet bearing her copyrighted work. On the other hand, if one treated each 
infringement by Pacific Mills as a discrete act giving rise to a separate claim, Tomasini’s claim for 
each and every discrete infringing act would still have accrued when her husband informed her about 
the sheet. At that moment, Tomasini would have known of at least one individual infringing act, and 
reasonably should have known or suspected that Pacific Mills had committed other, similar 
infringements. Discussions about the nature and definition of copyright infringement(s) do not address 
the critical issue courts must eventually wrestle with in applying the Statute—the date or dates the 
infringement(s) on which the complaint is based accrued.  
 55. Section 507(b) is not the only statute requiring courts to interpret and define “accrual.” In 
United States v. Kubrick, the Supreme Court struggled with the language of accrual in the context of 
the limitations provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which bars tort claims against the federal 
government unless they are “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years 
after such claim accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1998). The Kubrick Court emphasized that “the word 
‘accrues’ has created problems that need legislative attention.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 
129 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, dissenting); see also supra  note 14 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (“A claim accrues when an act of infringement occurs, not when consequent damage is 
suffered.”) (emphasis added); Repp v. Webber, 914 F.Supp. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The period of 
limitations begins to run from the moment the defendant commits an infringement, and when 
continuing infringement is asserted, from the last act of infringement.”) (emphasis added); Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Inst. v. Goldman, 228 U.S.P.Q. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 57. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996); Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 
(9th Cir. 1994) (“A cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one has knowledge of a 
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the latter interpretation is correct.58 
The word “accrue” is derived from the Latin “ad” and “creso,” meaning 
“to grow to.”59 Dictionary definitions support the conclusion that a claim 
accrues over a certain period,60 such as the period between the time an 
infringing act occurs and the time that a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
discovers or should have discovered the infringement and is therefore put on 
notice that he or she has a cause of action. These definitions do not suggest 
that the accrual of a claim is an immediate event concurrent with the moment 
an infringing act is committed.61 
 
 
violation or is chargeable with such knowledge.”); Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“A cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon 
which the claim is premised.”); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that 
“the tendency in modern law is to toll the statute of limitations until the victim could reasonably have 
discovered the cause of his woe.”). 
 58. The Supreme Court endorsed the “discovery rule” in United States v. Kubrick, a case 
involving a medical malpractice claim. 444 U.S. 111 (1979). Justice Stevens noted that: 
Essentially, there are two possible approaches to the construction of the word “accrues” in statutes 
of limitations: (1) a claim might be deemed to “accrue” at the moment of injury without regard to 
the potentially harsh consequence of barring a meritorious claim before the plaintiff has a 
reasonable chance to assert his legal rights, or (2) it might “accrue” when a diligent plaintiff has 
knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of an invasion of his legal rights.  
444 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, dissenting). 
Justice Stevens added that “[t]he benefits that flow from certainty in the administration of our affairs 
favor the former approach in most commercial situations.” However, the Court explicitly adopted the 
“discovery rule” by holding that the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim accrued when the plaintiff 
learned of the existence and cause of his injury. Id at 123. About the injured plaintiff, the Court 
reasoned “[t]hat he has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests 
itself.” Id. at 122. However, since the plaintiff waited more than two years (the statutory period) to file 
a claim after learning of the existence and cause of his injury, the Court barred the plaintiff’s action, 
stating that to hold otherwise “would undermine the purpose of the limitations statute, which is to 
require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims.” Id. at 123.  
 59. BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 20-21 (6th ed. 1990). BLACK ’S states that “[a] cause of action 
‘accrues’ when a suit may be maintained thereon” and notes that “the law in this regard differs from 
state-to-state and by nature of action (e.g. type of breach of contract, tort, etc.)” Id. at 21.  
 60. Webster’s Dictionary defines “accrue” as “to come into existence as a legally enforceable 
claim,” and “to come about as a natural growth, increase, or advantage.” WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY  50 (1990). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “accrue” as “to increase,” “to 
arise,” “to come into force or existence,” and “to vest .” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 20-21 (6th ed. 
1990). 
 61. It is possible that many courts (and commentators) are simply confusing “occur” with 
“accrue” and are therefore incorrectly equating the occurrence of an infringing act with the accrual of 
the resulting infringement claim. See, e.g., Joseph F. Key, Recent Decisions: The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 57 MD. L. REV. 1157. In the article, the author thoroughly dissects 
the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (118 F.3d. 199 
(4th Cir. 1997)) but incorrectly concludes that “the [Hotaling] court aptly applied the statute of 
limitations to allow recovery for only those infringing acts that occurred within the three-year 
limitations period.” Key, at 1177 (emphasis added). In fact, the Hotaling court held that “the statute of 
limitations bars recovery on claims that accrued [more than three years prior to filing of the suit].” 118 
F.3d at 202. In the author’s defense, the Hotaling court itself appeared to confuse “accrue” with 
“occur.” The court concluded that the plaintiff’s infringement claims all accrued within the three year 
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Perhaps most telling is the fact that Congress drafted Section 507(b) with 
one eye on an analogous statute of limitations in the Patent Act,62 but adopted 
very different, and considerably more arcane, language in the copyright 
Statute. Section 286 of the Patent Act provides that “no recovery shall be had 
for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the 
complaint.”63 This provision clearly and unambiguously starts its six-year 
limitations clock when an act of patent infringement occurs. However, in 
drafting Section 507(b), Congress chose instead to start the three-year 
limitations clock when a copyright claim accrues. The legislative history of 
the Statute is silent on Congress’s rationale for choosing language of 
“accrual.”64 It is not unreasonable to conclude, however, that Congress chose 
not to adopt the patent statute’s language because they did not want to equate 
the accrual of a copyright infringement claim with the occurrence of an 
infringing act.65 If Congress had intended the Statute’s three-year clock to 
start when an infringement occurred, it certainly knew how to say so in clear 
and unambiguous language. 
Therefore, for purposes of the Statute, the only correct interpretation of 
“accrual” in the context of 507(b) is that a copyright infringement claim 
accrues when a copyright owner knows of, or is chargeable with knowledge 
of, the infringement(s) on which his or her complaint is based. This 
interpretation of accrual is consistent with the Statute’s legislative history, 
 
 
period preceding filing of the suit. Id at 202-05. The court, however, continued with a lengthy 
discussion of the defendant’s argument that there was no evidence that any infringing act had occurred 
within the three year period preceding filing of the suit. As this Note indicates, the time an infringing 
act occurs is irrelevant for purposes of applying the Statute correctly.    
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1998). 
 63. Id. 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1998). Congress contrasted the two statutes by explaining that “ the 
relatively longer period of limitation” of § 286 of Patent Act was a result of that section’s “different 
concept”—the six-year patent statute of limitations is intended to be a limitation on the substantive 
right rather than upon the remedy. This explanation does nothing, however, to shed light on 
Congress’s choice of language of “accrual” in Section 507(b). 
 65. Other statutes provide insight into the variety of ways in which statutes of limitation may be 
written. The “Vessell Hull Design Protection Act ,” now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., was 
enacted to provide protection for non-copyrightable and non-patentable boat hull designs, and provides 
that “[n]o recovery . . . shall be had for any infringement committed more than [three] years before the 
date on which the complaint is filed.” 17 U.S.C. § 1323(c) (emphasis added) (entitled “Statute of 
Limitations”). Coincidentally, this provision exactly describes the prevailing interpretation of 507(b). 
In contrast, the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) includes a statute of limitations 
provision identical to that proposed for the Copyright Act in this Note. The CUTSA is essentially 
California’s codification of common trade secret law, and provides that “[a]n action for 
misappropriation [of a trade secret] must be brought within three years after the misappropriation is 
discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 3426.6 (West 1997) (emphasis added). The CUTSA adds that “a continuing misappropriation 
constitutes a single claim.” Id. This provision of the CUTSA is essentially a codification of the 
“continuing wrong” theory espoused in Taylor v. Meirick.  
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common definitions of accrual, and the holdings of leading copyright courts, 
including the Second and Ninth Circuits.66 
C. The Correct “Forward” Application of The Statute: Fixing the Three 
Year Clock  
On its face, Section 507(b) provides that a copyright owner must file an 
infringement suit within three years of the time the claim(s) on which the suit 
is based accrue(s). By its plain language, the Statute provides that the three 
year limitations clock starts when the infringing act(s) on which the 
complaint is based accrued. As noted above, a copyright infringement claim 
accrues when the copyright owner knew or should have known of an 
infringing act or series of infringing acts. With the plain language of the 
Statute and the correct definition of “accrual” in hand, application of the 
Statute becomes a straightforward matter. 
Therefore, courts and factfinders would correctly apply 507(b) by (1) 
determining the accrual date(s) of the infringement claim(s) contained in the 
complaint, i.e. the date(s) the plaintiff discovered, or by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence could have discovered, the infringement(s), (2) counting 
forward three years from the accrual date(s), and (3) determining whether the 
plaintiff copyright owner filed suit within this time period.67 If the plaintiff 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996) (barring plaintiff’s suit because 
plaintiff was “charged with knowledge of their [copyright co-ownership] claim as of 1961” but “did 
not initiate suit until 26 years later”); Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“A cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one has knowledge of a violation 
or is chargeable with such knowledge”); Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1042, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A 
cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the 
claim is premised.”). The Second and Ninth Circuits, home to the high-profile New York and 
California entertainment industries, are generally considered the bellwethers of copyright law.  
 67. Instead of relying on the continuing wrong theory, the Taylor court could have adopted the 
correct proposed interpretation of the Statute to achieve the same result. In Taylor, the plaintiff 
copyright owner’s infringement claims all accrued in 1979 when the plaintiff discovered the infringing 
maps manufactured by the defendant. As the claims accrued in 1979, and as the plaintiff filed suit on 
May 8, 1980 (well within the three year period allowed by the Statute), it follows that the Taylor court 
need not have relied on the discredited “continuing wrong” theory in allowing the plaintiff to recover 
all the defendant’s profits, including those realized more than three years prior the filing of the suit. 
The “continuing wrong” theory is a red herring that allowed other courts to reject the correct result 
reached in Taylor while ignoring the plain language of the Statute and avoiding sticky issues of accrual 
and diligence. 
 As in Taylor, the correct application of the Statute to the facts of the Section I hypothetical would 
have resulted in Tomasini’s recovery of all Pacific Mills’ profits resulting from their infringement. 
Given the correct definition of “accrual,” Tomasini’s infringement claims would all have accrued at 
the time her husband informed her about Pacific Mills infringing linens. At that moment, Tomasini 
would have gained actual knowledge of at least one infringement, and would have been put on notice 
that other infringements were likely. The three-year limitations clock would begin to run, and 
Tomasini would have three years in which to file suit for all the infringements, both actual and 
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filed within three years of accrual, the prevailing copyright owner would 
recover monetary remedies for any and all infringing acts for which relief is 
sought in the complaint.68 If not, the plaintiff who failed to file suit within 
three years after the claim accrued would be barred from recovering damages 
or profits for the infringing acts. Counting backwards is easier, but it is 
incorrect, and it can drastically reduce or completely eliminate awards of 
damages and profits to diligent and deserving copyright owners. 
D. Diligence and the Reasonable Copyright Owner 
The conclusion that a copyright infringement claim accrues when the 
copyright owner knew or should have known of the infringement raises 
several critical questions. Failing a “smoking gun” indication of 
infringement,69 when should a copyright owner know of an infringement? 
How diligent must a copyright owner be in “policing” his or her copyrights?  
The Taylor court correctly noted that “[a]lthough many cases state that 
mere ignorance of a cause of action does not toll the statute of limitations, in 
context these statements invariably mean only that the plaintiff has a duty of 
diligence: it is not enough that he did not discover he had a cause of action, if 
a reasonable man in his shoes would have.”70 As a result, the Taylor court 
held that “[o]ften, whether or not the defendant has done anything to conceal 
from the plaintiff the existence of a cause of action, the statute of limitations 
is tolled until the plaintiff learned or by reasonable diligence could have 
learned that he had a cause of action.”71 The leading commentator on 
copyright law has deemed this rule to be “a more liberal, and what appears 
. . . to be a better, view on the issue of whether the plaintiff’s ignorance of the 
 
 
suspected. Tomasini filed suit almost immediately after her claims accrued. A court finding that 
Pacific Mills had indeed infringed Tomasini’s copyright would have therefore been compelled, under 
the proposed interpretation of the Statute, to award all of Pacific Mills’ profits to Tomasini, including 
those realized from infringing acts committed more than three years prior to the filing of the suit.  
 68. The Taylor court correctly noted that a plaintiff copyright owner should be “spared having to 
bring successive suits” for each individual infringement in a series of continuing infringements. 
Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119. A plaintiff copyright owner should (and is) allowed to file a complaint 
seeking relief for one or more infringements, as most defendants do not commit a single infringing act. 
 69. The plaintiff in Roley v. New World Pictures was fortunate enough to receive just such a 
“smoking gun” indication of infringement when he viewed a film based on his copyrighted screenplay. 
19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994). The Roley court noted that the plaintiff alleged infringement 
immediately after first viewing the film and that “there is no dispute that [the plaintiff’s] claims 
accrued at that time.” Id. As the Tomasini hypothetical demonstrates, any copyright owners are not so 
fortunate in detecting infringements of their copyrights. See supra  notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
 70. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1118.  
 71. Id. at 1117. The Taylor court added that “[I]n a case such as this, where even if there had 
been no active concealment by the tortfeasor the injured party would have had no reason to suspect 
that he was the victim of a tort, there may be no duty of inquiry at all.” Id. at 1118 (emphasis added). 
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infringement will toll the statute.”72 
Courts and juries are thus left with the task of determining when a 
particular plaintiff discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
could have discovered, that he or she had a cause of action for copyright 
infringement. The limitations clock starts at this time, and plaintiff copyright 
owners must file suit before it stops three years later. While this 
determination often cannot be dispensed with quickly or easily, it is no more 
difficult than the issues facing courts and juries every day. The proposed 
interpretation of the Statute will allow courts and juries to weigh the 
copyright owner’s relative duty of diligence,73 the particular circumstances 
facing the owner, the type of monetary relief sought,74 and the nature of the 
infringing work75 in deciding whether the plaintiff was reasonably diligent 
 
 
 72. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05[B] at 12-124.8. In Parsons v. Tickner, a California court 
adopted a rule similar to that espoused by Nimmer and the Taylor court. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (1995). 
In Parsons, the court held that a deceased composer’s daughter had standing to pursue an action for 
fraud and other related causes against the composer’s former business managers 19 years after the 
composer’s death. The defendant business managers who, during the composer’s lifetime, 
administered the composer’s copyright royalties, fraudulently claimed that the composer had 
transferred all copyright interest to them upon the composer’s death; they concealed their fraud for 
years from all the composer’s heirs. Under those facts, the Parsons court held that the plaintiff “did not 
know and, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have discovered” the defendant’s 
misappropriation. Accordingly, it allowed the daughter to sue for a constructive trust for all money 
generated by the music. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819. The court added that  
where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the 
circumstances “a prudent man” would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of 
knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself of them, does not debar him from 
relief when thereafter he shall make actual discovery. 
Id. at 818 (citations omitted).   
 73. Copyright owners defy neat and definitive categorization. Clearly, however, some copyright 
owners, particularly large corporations, are blessed with enormous resources (e.g. large, market-savvy 
and geographically-dispersed sales and marketing staffs) with which to detect infringements of their 
copyrights. Accordingly, it could be argued that the corporation’s claim for a particular infringing act 
will accrue before an individual’s (e.g. Tomasini’s in the Section I hypothetical) claim for the same 
infringement—the corporation may indeed have an enhanced duty of diligence. 
 74. A prevailing plaintiff may recover either actual damages or the defendant’s profits. See supra 
note 6. However, a plaintiff requesting an award of actual damages may have an enhanced duty of 
diligence in detecting infringements as compared to the plaintiff requesting an accounting of an 
infringer’s profits. Actual damages are, by definition, measured by the infringement’s direct monetary 
effect upon the copyright owner—usually in the form of lost revenues, reduced market share, etc. A 
copyright owner who loses revenues or market share from an infringing competitor is typically alerted 
by these adverse effects.  Accordingly, this copyright owner’s infringement claim may accrue sooner 
than the claim of a copyright owner who incurs no direct damages and therefore elects to recover the 
infringer’s profits.  
 The proposed interpretation of the Statute would allow the court latitude to consider factors such 
as the type of monetary relief sought (damages or profits) and possible “notice” resulting from lost 
revenues or market share in determining when a particular infringement claim accrued.  
 75. Infringing derivative works are often, by their very nature, more difficult to detect than 
infringing non-derivative works. Some derivative works (e.g. a widely-released motion picture based 
upon a copyrighted screenplay) are, of course, readily detectable by the owner of the underlying 
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and when his or her particular infringement claim accrued.76 
E. Reward, Repose and Deterrence 
The prevailing application of the Statute, which effectively limits or 
completely bars recovery of damages or profits by diligent copyright owners, 
fails to promote Congressional goals. Copyright owners are frequently 
undercompensated for their labor or losses, or are not compensated at all. 
Willful, flagrant copyright infringers keep some or all of their ill-gotten 
profits and remain wholly undeterred, at the expense of artists, authors, 
software developers, and other copyright owners. In contrast, the proposed 
application of the Statute is grounded in sound policy. The proposed 
interpretation of the Statute would deter would-be infringers by ensuring that 
their illegal activities will ultimately be unprofitable, prevent the unjust 
enrichment of infringers, and promote the compensation, through licensing 
and other means, of deserving and reasonably diligent copyright owners.77 
The argument that society, the courts, and copyright owners should be 
overly concerned about providing repose to those who willfully steal the 
intellectual property of another is questionable at best. In any event, the 
proposed application of the Statute strikes an equitable balance between the 
plaintiff’s interest in being spared having to bring successive suits in cases of 
multiple infringements, and the defendant’s interests grounded in the 
 
 
copyrighted work. However, other infringing derivative works are significantly more difficult to 
detect. In the Section I hypothetical, for example, the infringing derivative work (the linens) was 
embodied in an entirely different form and medium than the underlying copyrighted work (Tomasini’s 
illustrations). The proposed interpretation of the Statute would allow courts to consider the nature of 
the infringing work in determining the time an infringement claim accrued.  
 76. Even diligent, well-staffed, market -savvy Corporate copyright owners may find it difficult to 
fully police all markets and geographic territories in an effort to detect infringing works. As the Taylor 
court noted,  
[t]he fact that a publisher loses sales to a competitor is not in  itself a clue to copyright 
infringement, since there is vigorous competition among copyrighted works. So we doubt that 
every time the sales of a publication dip, the publisher must, to preserve his right to sue for 
copyright infringement, examine all his competitors’ publications to make sure none is infringing 
any of his copyrights.  
Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983).  
 77. The Taylor court correctly noted that “[b]y preventing infringers from obtaining any net 
profit it makes any would-be infringer negotiate directly with the owner of a copyright that he wants to 
use, rather than bypass the market by stealing the copyright and forcing the owner to seek 
compensation from the courts for his loss.” Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1120. 
 Congress appears serious about preventing the unjust enrichment of copyright infringers through 
awards of an infringer’s ill-gotten profits to a prevailing copyright owner. For example, § 405 of the 
Copyright Act immunizes defendants from liability for actual or statutory damages in case of 
“innocent” infringement. A defendant’s profits, however, may still be awarded in such cases. 17 
U.S.C. § 405 (1998).  
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“repose” and “evidentiary” justifications for statutes of limitation.78 
Finally, the proposed interpretation of Section 507(b) is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s admonition that statutes of limitation “must be strictly 
adhered to by the judiciary”79 and “should not be given a grudging 
application.”80 The Statute will retain its “bite”; copyright owners who know 
or reasonably should know their work has been, or is being, infringed will 
not be allowed to “sit on their rights,” but will still be required to file an 
infringement suit within three years or be barred entirely from monetary 
recovery. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
As shown, the prevailing backwards interpretation and application of 
507(b) can drastically limit or completely eliminate profit and damage 
awards to highly deserving and reasonably diligent copyright owners. Two 
solutions—one judicial and one legislative—would resolve the matter. 
To date, the Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari to resolve the 
dispute over the correct interpretation and application of Section 507(b).81 
The Court should do so at the earliest possible date, preferably in a case 
involving parties and facts similar to those presented in the hypothetical of 
Section I, in which a reasonably diligent copyright owner files suit promptly 
 
 
 78. See Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119. The Taylor court noted that “when the final act of an unlawful 
course of conduct occurs within the statutory period, [the purposes of statutes of limitation] are 
adequately served . . . by requiring the plaintiff to sue within the statutory period but letting him reach 
back and get damages for the entire duration of the alleged violation.” Id. In addressing the 
“evidentiary” and “repose” rationales for statutes of limitation, the court added that “[s]ome of the 
evidence, at least, will be fresh” and “the defendant’s uncertainty as to whether he will be sued at all 
will be confined to the statutory period.” Id. 
 As previously mentioned, it is questionable whether a willful, continuing copyright infringer is 
deserving of “repose.” Similarly, a defendant’s concern with the evidentiary rationale behind statutes 
of limitation may be unfounded in cases of copyright infringement, given the commercial nature of 
nearly all infringements and the resulting profusion of detailed transactional records routinely 
preserved for many years in the course of business.  
 79. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) (discussing statutes of limitation in the context 
of a tax statute). 
 80. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). See also 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (Steven J., dissenting) (Noting that statutes of limitation “remain as 
ubiquitous as the statutory rights . . . to which they are attached or are applicable. We should give them 
effect in accordance with what we can ascertain the legislative intent to have been”). While statutes of 
limitation should not be given a grudging application, it does not follow that they should be given an 
incorrect application with no basis in plain language or legislative intent.  
 81. Certiorari was denied by the Court in Zuill v. Shanahan. 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 763 (1997). However, Zuill dealt with Section 507(b) in the context of co-ownership 
of a copyright, facts distinguishable from those at issue in this Note. The Court also denied certiorari in 
Stone v. Williams. 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993). Stone was not a 
copyright infringement case, but involved a claim of entitlement to renew copyrights.  
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after discovering a continuing, long-term series of willful infringements. 
Failing a grant of certiorari, Congress could easily amend the Statute to 
incorporate clear, unambiguous language and explicitly allow monetary 
remedies for all infringing acts, provided the copyright owner files suit 
within three years of his or her knowledge (actual or constructive) of the 
infringing acts. Specifically, Section 507(b) should be amended to read as 
follows: 
No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title 
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim on which the 
action is based is discovered or, by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, should have been discovered.82  
Alternatively, Congress could leave the language of Section 507(b) intact 
and simply define “accrual” in 17 U.S.C. § 101, the “Definitions” section of 
the Copyright.83 
V. CONCLUSION 
The prevailing backwards, inequitable and incorrect interpretation and 
application of 507(b) drastically limits the extent and amount of monetary 
remedies available to deserving copyright owners. As a result, creative minds 
and copyright owners frequently go unrewarded, infringers are allowed to 
keep significant ill-gotten profits, and would-be infringers remain undeterred. 
Interpreting and applying 507(b) in the proposed manner will lead to 
more equitable monetary awards by allowing the reasonably diligent 
copyright owner to reach back and recover for all infringing acts. The plain 
language and legislative intent of 507(b), the purposes of copyright law and 
monetary remedies, and the underlying rationale for statutes of limitations 
dictate that copyright’s three-year clock be fixed.  
Bart A. Starr 
 
 
 82. This language is the same as that used in the California Trade Secrets Act, codified as Cal. 
Civ. Code § 3426.6 (West 1997). The California Trade Secrets Act also explicitly endorses the 
“continuing wrong” theory by treating continuing trade secret misappropriations as a single claim. See 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6. However, as noted, interpreting and applying 507(b) correctly does not 
require the adoption of the “continuing wrong” theory; it is sufficient to define “accrual” correctly and 
apply the Statute in correct “forward” fashion. 
 83. Other countries have adopted civil copyright statutes of limitations consistent with the 
proposed version of 507(b). Thailand, for example, has enacted a type of hybrid statute providing that 
an action for copyright infringement must be initiated no later than three years from the date when the 
owner of the copyright became aware of the infringement, and no later than ten years from the date of 
the infringement itself. See INTELL. PROP. IN ASIA 2E § 10.32 at 10-29 (1999). 
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